Multicast transmissions in non-cooperative networks with a limited number of selfish moves

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4162 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 363-374

  Fanelli, Angelo ^a   Flammini, Michele ^a   Melideo, Giovanna ^a   Moscardelli, Luca ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF L'AQUILA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Limited number of best responses; Multicast; Nash equilibria; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COSTS; PROBLEM SOLVING; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

CASE RATIO; COST YIELDED; MULTICAST TRANSMISSIONS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NON-COOPERATIVE NETWORKS;

MULTICASTING;

EID: 33750050243     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11821069_32     Document Type: Conference Paper

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