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Economic Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 285-309

Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning

(1) Chambers, Christopher P a

a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548217759 PISSN: 09382259 EISSN: 14320479 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0146-y Document Type: Article

Times cited : (5)

References (13)

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- An economic model of representative democracy
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- Sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy
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- Besley, T.¹ Coate, S.²

6
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- Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
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- Besley, T.¹ Coate, S.²

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- Harper and Row New York
- Downs A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row, New York
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- A voting model implying Duverger's Law and positive turnout
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- Spatial models of political competition under plurality rule: A survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take
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12
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