Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 31-56

  Weber, Shlomo ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21944444630     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050090     Document Type: Article

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