Limited commitment in multi-agent contracting

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 345-375

  Feltham, Gerald A ^a   Hofmann, Christian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Incentives; Interagent negotiation; Multi agent contracting; Performance evaluation

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547770259     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/Y677-U574-3466-8122     Document Type: Article

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