Monitoring in Multiagent Organizations

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 483-511

  Baldenius, Tim ^a   Melumad, Nahum D ^a   Ziv, Amir ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (Israel)

Author keywords

Aggregation; Monitoring; Organization design; Principal agent; Randomization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347939865     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/0PJG-FUTB-KJ5P-2FX0     Document Type: Article

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