Production externalities, congruity of aggregate signals, and optimal task assignments

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 393-408

  Hughes, John S ^a   Zhang, Li ^a   Xie, Jai Zheng James ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Complementarities; Congruity; Effort allocations; Incentives; Repetition; Task assignments

Indexed keywords

EID: 21144455359     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/Q69Y-HLQF-D134-WGU7     Document Type: Article

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