Centralized and decentralized contracts in a moral Hazard environment

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 489-510

  Macho Stadler, Inès ^a   Pérez Castrillo, J David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039165832     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00084     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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