Toward a unified theory of interstate conflict

International Interactions

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 305-327

  Zagare, Frank C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

Credibility; Escalation; Interstate conflict; Necessary conditions; Perfect deterrence theory; Power transition; War

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547512261     PISSN: 03050629     EISSN: 15477444     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03050620701451153     Document Type: Article

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