Uncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement

American Political Science Review

Volumn 90, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 749-764

  Powell, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305714     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2945840     Document Type: Article

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