The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 374-400

  Várdy, Felix ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

First mover advantage; Leader follower game; Observation cost; Stackelberg duopoly; Value of commitment

Indexed keywords

EID: 7244261906     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.003     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Bagwell K. Commitment and observability in games Games Econ. Behav. 8 1995 271-280
2. Van Damme E. Hurkens S. Games with imperfectly observable commitment Games Econ. Behav. 21 1997 282-308
3. Harsanyi J.C. Selten R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games 1988 MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
4. Hofbauer J. Sigmund K. The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems 1988 Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge
5. Huck S. Müller W. Perfect versus imperfect observability-an experimental test of Bagwell's result Games Econ. Behav. 31 2000 174-190
6. Kalai E. Samet D. Persistent equilibria in strategic games Int. J. Game Theory 13 1984 129-144
7. Maggi G. The value of commitment with imperfect observability and private information RAND J. Econ. 30 1999 555-574
8. Morgan, J., Várdy, F., 2001. An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs. PhD dissertation. Princeton University
9. Oechssler J. Schlag K. Loss of commitment: An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example Int. Game Theory Rev. 2 2000 83-96
10. Selten R. A note on evolutionary stability in asymmetric animal contests J. Theoret. Biol. 84 1980 93-101
11. Von Stackelberg H. Marktform und Gleichgewicht 1934 Springer-Verlag, Vienna/Berlin