Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 54-74

  Güth, Werner ^a   Kirchsteiger, Georg ^b   Ritzberger, Klaus ^c  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Austria)

Author keywords

Commitments; imperfect observability; subgame perfection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008341901     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0602     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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