The value of commitment with imperfect observability and private information

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 555-574

  Maggi, Giovanni ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033269839     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2556065     Document Type: Article

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