An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 401-423

  Morgan, John ^a,c   Várdy, Felix ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^c NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Costly leader games; Experiments; Observation costs; Stackelberg duopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 7244234394     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.005     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. K. Bagwell Commitment and observability in games Games Econ. Behav. 8 1995 271-280
2. E. Damme van S. Hurkens Games with imperfectly observable commitment Games Econ. Behav. 21 1997 282-308
3. W. Güth G. Kirchsteiger K. Ritzberger Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games Games Econ. Behav. 23 1998 54-74
4. S. Huck W. Müller Perfect versus imperfect observability - An experimental test of Bagwell's result Games Econ. Behav. 31 2000 174-190
5. R. McKelvey T. Palfrey Quantal response equilibria for normal form games Games Econ. Behav. 10 1995 6-38
6. R. McKelvey T. Palfrey Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games Exper. Econ. 1 1998 9-41
7. J. Oechssler K. Schlag Loss of commitment: An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example Int. Game Theory Rev. 2 2000 83-96
8. F. Várdy The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs Games Econ. Behav. 49 2004 374-400