The mean voter theorem: Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 965-980

  Schofield, Norman ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTORAL SYSTEM; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; MODELING; PARTY POLITICS; POLICY ANALYSIS; POLITICAL THEORY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

ASIA; EURASIA; ISRAEL; MIDDLE EAST;

EID: 34250772376     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00444.x     Document Type: Article

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