The dilemma behind the classical dilemma of civil-military relations: The "Discourse Space" model and the Israeli case during the Oslo process

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 518-546

  Michael, Kobi ^a,b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Civil control; Civil military relations; Discourse space; Influence; Israel

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250363112     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X06298730     Document Type: Article

References (110)

1. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).
2. H. Richard Kohn, "How Democracies Control?" Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997).
3. . Douglas L. Bland, "Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999).
4. Bland, 1999.
5. Kohn, 1997, 143.
6. D. Peter Feaver, Armed Servant: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
7. D. Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996). Feaver, Civil-Military Relations - United States.
8. C. Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military - The Changing Security Envimnment (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999; paperback, 2001).
9. Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998).
10. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military - The Changing Security Environment.
11. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control."
12. D. Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military," Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998).
13. Feaver, Civil-Military Relations - United States.
14. Feaver, 2003, 292-298.
15. Kobi Michael, "The Dialectic Interaction between the Military and the Political Echelons During the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Peace Process to Violent Confrontation 2000-2005, ed. Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005).
16. Kobi Michael, "The End of the Deterministic Distinction - The Low Intensity War Era as a Paradigmic Challenge for Civil-Military Relations in the Democratic State," in The Limited Conflict, ed. Hagay and Shay Golan, Shaul (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arachot, 2004a).
17. Yehoshaft Harkabi, War and Strategy, 4th ed. (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1994), 526.
18. Dauber elaborates on the importance of argumentation and the advantages the military holds in this regard in the United States. For further details see Cori Dauber, "The Practice of Argument: Reading the Condition of Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998).
19. "The CGS is a respected public figure in Israel who often appears in civilian, public forums. He uses these occasions to introduce assessments and express professional positions. These appearances become, in some occasions, a ramming tool used by the military echelon to pressure and influence the political echelon. By influencing and even shaping the public consciousness, the CGS generates public pressure that undoubtedly influences the political level." (Kobi Michael, Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict - The Israeli Case, forthcoming, Israel Studies, Indiana University Press.
20. (Kobi Michael, Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict - The Israeli Case Ibid.
21. Williams (1999) warned about the danger of the military, professional strategy domination over the designation of national interests and objectives. John Allen Williams, "The Military and Modern Society: Civilian-Military Relations in Post-Cold War," America, World and I 14, no. 9 (1999). Such a blurred boundary can easily lead to the intervention of the military echelon in civilian spheres and to a weakening of the latter's authority. In my dissertation I characterize influence by its six dimensions, which I examine one-by-one in the two cases I compare.
22. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military - the Changing Security Environment, 8-21.
23. Asher Arian, David Nachmias, Doron Navot, and Daniel Shani, 2003 Democracy Index (Jerusalem: The Israeli Institute for Democracy, 2003). Ephraim Ya'ar and Tamar Hermann, The Peace Index February 2005: AIDF is the entity which earns the highest trust among the Israeli Public and the common appraisal is that its influence on national policy making is appropriate. . . . The data indicates that the military earns the highest trust of the Jewish population: 73 percent feel full trust and 21 percent trust, total of 94 percent" - translated from Hebrew.
24. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," Armed Forces & Society 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996).
25. Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots - Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1983; paper edition 1985).
26. Yram Peri, "The Political-Military Complex: The Idf Influence over Policy Towards the Palestinians since 1987," Israel Affairs 11 (2 April 2005).
27. Peri, 1983;
28. Kobi Michael, "The Military's Influence on the Transition Process from War to Peace - the Israeli Case - Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with Egypt and Oslo Process." (PhD Diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2004b).
29. "The problem, as usual in Israel, begins with the definitions. Who is the political echelon? The Prime Minister? The Defense Minister? The cabinet? The government? What if there is no agreement between all of those?" Amir Oren, "Terror Will Always Be," Ha'aretz, July 15, 2005.
30. Yehuda Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
31. Michael, 2004b.
32. Aviezer Ya'ari, "Memorandum No. 72 - the Civil Control over the Military in Israel" (Tel-Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University, 2004).
33. P. Christopher, Snider Gibson, M. Don, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process," Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 2 (Winter 1999).
34. Oren Barak, Sheffer, Gabriel, "Israel's 'Security Network' and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach," International Journal of Middle East Studies 38 (2006).
35. Yoram Peri, "The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy from Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada," in Peaceworks No. 47 (Washington: USIP, 2002).
36. Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, in the MALTAM Seminar, February 24, 2003: "Military level and political level are two different worlds. The political level is not always sufficiently well acquainted with the army and its abilities."
37. The term was coined by D. L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 1: 19.
38. Noteworthy in this context are remarks by the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, at the MALTAM Seminar: "Coherence and deep understanding between the political level and all the military levels below it are highly importance.
39. To that end, it is necessary to maintain a continuous and ongoing dialogue between the different levels, a dialogue with the aim of generating knowledge in a changing environment" (emphases added).
40. Yoram Peri (1983) termed and described the relationship between the echelons in Israel as "partnership" and in his last article in this regard he even developed the concept further.
41. For additional details see Yoram Peri. "The Political-Military Complex: The IDF Influence Over Policy Towards the Palestinians Since 1987," Israel Affairs, 11, no. 2 (2005): 324-344.
42. Saguy, Uri. Lights Within the Fog (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot - Sifrei Hemed, 1998), 142.
43. Huntington (1977) wrote that in assessing security threats, the military man looks more at the capabilities of other states than at their intentions. This is because intentions are political in character and political assessments are outside the realm of his professional authority. The army's responsibility is to be ready for any development.
44. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Complications between Intelligence and the Statesman," in Intelligence and National Security (Mirkam Series, Maarachot, 1987; 2nd ed. May 1988), 445.
45. On the work of intelligence research and its components and complexity, see Isaac Ben-Israel, Dialogues on Science and Military Intelligence (Maarachot Publishing House); on the responsibility for formulating the national military assessment in Israel
46. see Shlomo Gazit, Between Warning and Surprise (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, October 2003).
47. An example of this form of influence is cited by Beilin: "Intelligence estimates often reach the media immediately and are perceived as the absolute truth, despite the multiplicity of fallacious assessments. . . . They played a negative role in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. . . . I have no doubt that the relationship between the government and the military, and the army's exaggerated independence in this period, had a negative impact on our ability to reach an arrangement. The moment in which the state allows the IDF to 'win' will be the moment of its own defeat." Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement 1996-2004 (New York: RDV Books/Akashic Books, 2004);
48. English version of Manual for a Wounded Dove (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2001), 289-291.
49. Headline of a report by Amir Rapaport, Maariv, January 22, 2004.
50. The differentiation between substantive and formal civil control was made by Yagil Levy, The Other Army of Israel - Materialist Militarism in Israel, Tapuah (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot - Sifray Hemed, 2003).
51. Ben Caspit, interview with Brig. Gen. Eival Giladi, Maariv, January 2, 2004.
52. Yorm Peri, "The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada," Peaceworks (November 2002): 34-35; http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks47.pdf
53. Shlomo Gazit, Between Warning and Surprise (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, October 2003), 55.
54. Yossi Sarid, personal interview, June 25, 2003.
55. Ofer Shelah, The Israeli Army: A Radical Proposal (Tel Aviv: Kinneret and Zmora Bitan 2003), 115.
56. The Israeli Army: A Radical Proposal Ibid., 113.
57. Senior officers who have just retired from the military establishment find it difficult "to adjust to the different rules of the game in the civilian society in relation to the military society. . . . The Defense Ministers are chiefs of staff or major generals who have doffed their uniform and then their whole mode of behavior is the result of this - the same thing but in a different garb." (Yossi Sarid, personal interview, June 12, 2003).
58. The data regarding the case is taken mostly from Michael's Ph.D. dissertation (Michael, "The Military's Influence on the Transition Process from War to Peace - The Israeli Case - Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with Egypt and Oslo Process") that focuses on the military's involvement in the Oslo process, its roles and influence. Because of length limits of this article only few examples are used to demonstrate the model's implications and lead to the major conclusions that are actually the answers to the questions introduced in previous parts of this article.
59. Yair Hirshfeld, Oslo: A Formulation for Peace (Rabin Center Publication and Am-Oved Publication, 2000): 153-154.
60. Michael, "The Military's Influence on the Transition Process from War to Peace - The Israeli Case - Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with Egypt and Oslo Process".
61. Arie M. Cacowicz. "Rashomon in Jerusalem: Mapping the Israeli Negotiators' Positions on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2001," International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 252-273.
62. MALTAM Seminar, February 24, 2003.
63. Yoav Limor, interview with Major General Yitzhak Eitan, chief of Central Command, Maariv (March 29, 2002).
64. Dan Meridor, personal interview, May 27, 2003. The publicist and military analyst Amir Oren (Haaretz, February 6, 2004) summed up the subject rather cynically, noting, "the intention of the supreme [political] level is decoded [by the military] according to [politicians'] media appearances - in speeches, in interviews, in commentaries viewed as being based on briefings."
65. For further evidence in this regard see Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Peace Process to Violent Confrontation 2000-2005 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005).
66. See Gilad's talk, "Evaluation of developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," delivered on December 25, 2001
67. at the Intelligence Heritage Center, in Views of the Generals: The Collapse of the Oslo Process and the Violent Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed. (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003), 39-48.
68. "The campaign is between two societies that are contesting territory and, to a certain extent, existence. I do not think the Palestinian society is under existential threat. But we are under existential threat. In other words, there is asymmetry here, but in reverse. Everyone thinks we are Goliath and they are David; I maintain that the reverse is the case." Ibid, (emphasis added).
69. This was manifested, for example, in activities that bore a distinct propaganda character, such as international information missions undertaken by senior figures from the security establishment and the intelligence community, the compilation of a White Book on Arafat and incriminating material against the Palestinian Authority for information purposes at the request of the political level.
70. "I have no doubt that when this period is viewed from historical perspective it will be said that the War of Independence was the most important event in our history and this war was second in importance." Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, interview with Ari Shavit, Haaretz, August 29, 2002.
71. Amir Oren, "MI as government propagandist," Haaretz, February 6, 2003.
72. Ran Edelist, "MI at your request," Ynet.
73. Dan Meridor, personal interview, May 27, 2003.
74. "The key point here is the staying power of the Israeli society. That is the most important factor that is being put to the test at this time and will continue to be put to the test in the near future. That is what the campaign is about. . . . Because we are dealing with an existential threat. There was an Israeli attempt to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by means of a territorial compromise, and the Palestinian
75. reply was war. So this brings us back to the confrontation of the pre-state period.... Do we have a choice? We must." Ari Shavit, interview with the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, Haaretz, August 29, 2002.
76. For further elaboration on the methodology and the basic concepts, see Colonel Shmuel Nir (Samo), Limited Conflict, Training Doctrine, 2001;
77. Gal Hirsh, "From 'Molten Lead' to 'Another Way' - Development of the Campaign in Central Command 2000-2003," Maarachot (February 2004), 393;
78. Moshe Ya'alon, "Force preparation for a limited conflict," Maarachot, (December 2001), 380-381;
79. and Ari Shavit, interview with the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, Haaretz August 29, 2002.
80. Ben Caspit, interview with Brigadier General Eival Giladi, Maariv, January 2, 2004.
81. Amir Oren, "Choice or Flight," Haaretz, February 6, 2004.
82. The State Comptroller (reports 52A and 53B) noted the problematic element in the duality that characterizes the missions of the Plans and Policy Directorate, because of its intensive engagement in state-policy planning, and also its centrality in connection with the activity of the policy-making level. See State Comptroller Report 53B at www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/default.asp and, for Report 52A, www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/homepage.asp.
83. Amir Oren, "Choice or Flight," Haaretz, February 6, 2004.
84. "It is the Plans and Policy Directorate which is preparing the drafts for the response to the road map of the Quartet, even though this is not a purely military issue. The reason is that the army has distinctive capabilities in staff work and in using experts" - Major General Giora Eiland, MALTAM Seminar, February 24, 2003.
85. Matan Vilnai, personal interview, June 25, 2003; emphases added.
86. Gilad Sher, Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations 1999-2001 (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2001) 368
87. emphasis added. See also Ben-Ami, "In this crisis the IDF acted according to its own spirit, not always in the spirit of the political directives,"
88. Shlomo Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2004), 319.
89. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, personal interview, June 11, 2003. Ben Caspit wrote in this regard: "Written directives of the political level being formulated, written, signed and sent nowhere. They remained filed in the various folders." Maariv, part 1, September 6, 2002; part 2, September 13, 2002; emphasis added.
90. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak Written directives of the political level being formulated, written, signed and sent nowhere. They remained filed in the various folders." Maariv, part 1, 2002; Ibid, (emphasis added).
91. Ben-Ami, 2004, 397.
92. Shelah, 2003, 79.
93. Matan Vilnai, personal interview, June 25, 2003; emphasis added.
94. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, personal interview, July 11, 2003; emphasis added.
95. Colonel Shaul Arieli in a personal interview.
96. Gilad Sher, personal interview, July 29, 2003; emphasis added.
97. Gilad Sher, personal interview, August 3, 2003.
98. Avi Gil, personal interview, July 28, 2003.
99. LG Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, July 11, 2003.
100. Ibid.
101. Yossi Beilin, 2004, p. 364.
102. Nahum Barnea, "Peres: Sharon has to do mental stocktaking," Yedioth Ahronoth, October 1, 2001.
103. Dauber, "The Practice of Argument: Reading the Condition of Civil-Military Relations."
104. MK Yossi Sarid (former minister in Rabin and Barak cabinets), personal interview, June 12, 2003.
105. Shaul Ariely, personal interview, July 28, 2003.
106. Dr. Ron Pundak, personal interview, May 19, 2003.
107. For more details regarding this weakness, see Ya'ari's comprehensive research on civil control over the IDF: Aviezer Ya'ari, "The Civil Control over the Military in Israel," Memorandum 72 (Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, October 2004), 23, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34-35 (Hebrew).
108. Ya'ari, 2004, 34.
109. LG. Moshe Ya'alon, former CGS, personal interview, July 10, 2005.
110. Ben Caspit, "IDF accuses ministers of shirking responsibility," Maariv, May 27, 2004, in reference to Operation Rainbow in Rafah.