Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 193-218

  Gibson, Christopher P ^a,b,c   Snider, Don M ^d,e  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b Department of American Politics ^*  (United States)

^c Army Legislative Liaison   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^e UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033448846     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9902500202     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. There are several recent works that make this claim. For the most cited example see Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. For other prominent works with similar arguments, see Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 27-58; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control on the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29 (1994): 341-392; Edward Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary (May 1994): 29-33; and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations." Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.
2. There are several recent works that make this claim. For the most cited example see Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. For other prominent works with similar arguments, see Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 27-58; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control on the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29 (1994): 341-392; Edward Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary (May 1994): 29-33; and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations." Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.
3. There are several recent works that make this claim. For the most cited example see Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. For other prominent works with similar arguments, see Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 27-58; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control on the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29 (1994): 341-392; Edward Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary (May 1994): 29-33; and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations." Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.
4. There are several recent works that make this claim. For the most cited example see Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. For other prominent works with similar arguments, see Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 27-58; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control on the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29 (1994): 341-392; Edward Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary (May 1994): 29-33; and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations." Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.
5. There are several recent works that make this claim. For the most cited example see Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. For other prominent works with similar arguments, see Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57 (October 1993): 27-58; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control on the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29 (1994): 341-392; Edward Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary (May 1994): 29-33; and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations." Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.
6. See Thomas Ricks, "The Great Society in Camouflage," Atlantic Monthly (December 1996); James Carroll, "War Inside the Pentagon," The New Yorker, 18 August 1997; and James Webb, "The War on the Military Culture," The Weekly Standard, 20 January 1997.
7. See Thomas Ricks, "The Great Society in Camouflage," Atlantic Monthly (December 1996); James Carroll, "War Inside the Pentagon," The New Yorker, 18 August 1997; and James Webb, "The War on the Military Culture," The Weekly Standard, 20 January 1997.
8. See Thomas Ricks, "The Great Society in Camouflage," Atlantic Monthly (December 1996); James Carroll, "War Inside the Pentagon," The New Yorker, 18 August 1997; and James Webb, "The War on the Military Culture," The Weekly Standard, 20 January 1997.
9. While beyond the specific focus of this paper, it can be speculated that finding his official power and influence insufficient to preserve the norms and values he felt necessary for the future of the Air Force, General Fogleman chose to resign, believing he could best influence the debate from the private sector.
10. These central issues can be found in the theoretical, sociological, and comparative literature; see Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971); and Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries, ed. Clark Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).
11. These central issues can be found in the theoretical, sociological, and comparative literature; see Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971); and Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries, ed. Clark Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).
12. These central issues can be found in the theoretical, sociological, and comparative literature; see Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971); and Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries, ed. Clark Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).
13. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80-97.
14. This is essentially the analysis presented by Kohn in "Out of Control" and most recently in "The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government," Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper #11, (June 1997); for a more explicit application of this methodology covering many more decisions in the post-Cold War period, see Desch, "Losing Control."
15. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), ch. 1.
16. There are several reasons for the increasing area of overlap in the current period, most coming from the fact that the post-Cold War nature of conflict involving U.S. forces (regional, conventional, and unconventional) draws more from the functional expertise of the professional soldier than from the elected or appointed civilian leader. This was not the case during the Cold War, during which most strategic thought/doctrine on nuclear deterrence and the arms control issues associated with such conflict emanated from civilian theorists in academia and the governmental agencies of the nuclear era. See Richard Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" World Politics 50 (1997): 7-33.
17. Hugh Helco, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in The New American Political System, ed. Anthony King (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87-124.
18. "Discussion between co-author (Snider) and Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs," January 1989.
19. Professor John Kingdom provides insight for this point. "Superior argumentation does not always carry the day, to be sure. But in our preoccupation with power and influence, political scientists sometimes neglect the importance of content. Both the substance of the ideas and political pressures are often important in moving some subjects into prominence and in keeping other subjects low on government agendas." See Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995), 127.
20. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
21. Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), and "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?" Security Studies 6 (Winter 96-97): 71-113.
22. Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), and "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?" Security Studies 6 (Winter 96-97): 71-113.
23. Peter Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations." Harvard Project on U.S. Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper #4, May 1996.
24. The seminal work in this area was edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
25. Apart from the seminal publication mentioned above and North's piece cited earlier, other prominent works in the new institutionalist approach include James March and Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-49; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 223-46; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism,'" in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, eds. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
26. Apart from the seminal publication mentioned above and North's piece cited earlier, other prominent works in the new institutionalist approach include James March and Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-49; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 223-46; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism,'" in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, eds. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
27. Apart from the seminal publication mentioned above and North's piece cited earlier, other prominent works in the new institutionalist approach include James March and Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-49; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 223-46; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism,'" in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, eds. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
28. Apart from the seminal publication mentioned above and North's piece cited earlier, other prominent works in the new institutionalist approach include James March and Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-49; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 223-46; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism,'" in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, eds. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
29. There has been some good work done in the international security studies field in the area of norms over the past decade. See, for example, S. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988): 66-94; J. Meyer, "Political Structure and the World Economy," Contemporary Sociology (1982): 263-266; J. E. Thompson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," International Journal of Group Tensions 23 (1993): 67-83; and Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986): 273-286.
30. There has been some good work done in the international security studies field in the area of norms over the past decade. See, for example, S. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988): 66-94; J. Meyer, "Political Structure and the World Economy," Contemporary Sociology (1982): 263-266; J. E. Thompson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," International Journal of Group Tensions 23 (1993): 67-83; and Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986): 273-286.
31. There has been some good work done in the international security studies field in the area of norms over the past decade. See, for example, S. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988): 66-94; J. Meyer, "Political Structure and the World Economy," Contemporary Sociology (1982): 263-266; J. E. Thompson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," International Journal of Group Tensions 23 (1993): 67-83; and Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986): 273-286.
32. There has been some good work done in the international security studies field in the area of norms over the past decade. See, for example, S. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988): 66-94; J. Meyer, "Political Structure and the World Economy," Contemporary Sociology (1982): 263-266; J. E. Thompson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," International Journal of Group Tensions 23 (1993): 67-83; and Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986): 273-286.
33. This is an excellent example of institutional adaptation. Thanks to James Burk for this insight. For more on this topic, see Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), and John Nagl, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War" (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1997).
34. This is an excellent example of institutional adaptation. Thanks to James Burk for this insight. For more on this topic, see Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), and John Nagl, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War" (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1997).
35. For an excellent legislative history of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Thomas L. McNaugher and Roger L. Sperry, "Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense," in Who Makes Public Policy? The Struggle for Control between Congress and the Executive, eds. Robert S. Gilmour and Alexis A. Halley (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1994), 219-258.
36. See also Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time (New York: Free Press, 1986).
37. This claim is supported by the results of in-depth interviews conducted by Chris Gibson over the past year with current and former members of the national security decision-making teams and their key staff assistants, 1965-1995. A complete listing of those he interviewed is provided below. General Wes Clark, former J5; currently SACEUR 28 April 1997 Dr. Alain Enthoven, former Assistant SecDef Systems Analysis 27 May 1997 Hon. Melvin Laird (written responses), former SecDef 28 May 1997 Hon. Walter Slocombe, Under SecDef for Policy 10 June 1997 Hon. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, former Under SecDef for Policy 10 June 1997 Hon. Ronald Dellums (D-Cal.) 12 June 1997 Admiral (retired) Stansfield Turner, former Dir. CIA 12 June 1997 Hon. Lee Hamilton (D-In.) 17 June 1997 Dr. David Chu, former Asst SecDef for PA&E 18 June 1997 General (ret.) Edward "Shy" Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff 19 June 1997 Gen (ret.) Bernard Rogers, former Army Chief of Staff; SACEUR 19 June 1997 Hon. Dr. William Perry, former SecDef 23 June 1997 Hon. Stanley Resor, former Sec Army and Under SecDef Policy 30 June 1997 Hon. Dr. Harold Brown (written responses), former Sec Def 30 June 1997 Hon. Ed Meese, former Counselor to the President and AG 30 July 1997 Admiral (ret.) Jonathan Howe, Chief U.S. State Dept. Rep in Somalia 4 August 1997 Major McDonald Heston, FAO Branch, U.S. Army 20 June 1996 Bert Mizusawa, Professional Staff Member, SASC 27 March 1997 Fred Downey, Professional Staff Member, SASC 8 April 1997 Lee Halterman, Professional Staff Member, HNSC 12 June 1997
38. Christopher P. Gibson, "Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security Through Madisonian Concepts" (Ph.D. diss. Cornell University, January 1998); see ch. 4.
39. David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," World Politics 48 (October 1995): 117-141.
40. Gibson "Countervailing Forces," ch. 4.
41. See also Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," in U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, eds. Don Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1995), 34-67.
42. For an example of military initiative in the absence of civilian guidance see the recently published Army manuals on Domestic Support Operations (FM100-19), pp. 1-6, and Peace Operations (FM100-23), pp. 15-16. These sections provide guidance for military commanders when the civilian leadership fails to establish adequate goals, objectives, and termination criteria. Similar language can be found in new Joint Publications on the same doctrines, e.g., "Joint Commanders' Handbook for Operations Other Than War" (Joint Publication 100-03).
43. For an example of military initiative in the absence of civilian guidance see the recently published Army manuals on Domestic Support Operations (FM100-19), pp. 1-6, and Peace Operations (FM100-23), pp. 15-16. These sections provide guidance for military commanders when the civilian leadership fails to establish adequate goals, objectives, and termination criteria. Similar language can be found in new Joint Publications on the same doctrines, e.g., "Joint Commanders' Handbook for Operations Other Than War" (Joint Publication 100-03).
44. For an example of military initiative in the absence of civilian guidance see the recently published Army manuals on Domestic Support Operations (FM100-19), pp. 1-6, and Peace Operations (FM100-23), pp. 15-16. These sections provide guidance for military commanders when the civilian leadership fails to establish adequate goals, objectives, and termination criteria. Similar language can be found in new Joint Publications on the same doctrines, e.g., "Joint Commanders' Handbook for Operations Other Than War" (Joint Publication 100-03).
45. A stark example of such a manifestation was the role played by the military in the intense infighting between the State and Defense departments during the long development of the Clinton Administration's national security document dealing with military intervention. For more on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." State Department Publication 10161 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 1994), 4-5.
46. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947-1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995).
47. Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in The New American Political System, 87-124.
48. For those interested in seeing the data sets, we recommend either contacting the Olin Institute at Harvard for the Working Paper with the data for the agents for three time periods (1966, 1982, and 1994) or, for the complete data set, ordering Gibson's dissertation through the closest university library.
49. Indeed, individual biographical corrections from earlier versions of the paper have affected aggregate data values, even if only slightly.
50. Gibson, "Countervailing Forces," ch. 5. The dual entries (e.g., the entries for the military in 1994 of 14/12) indicate the scores for both key individuals during that year; for the 1994 case, both Powell's and Shalikashvili's numerical values.
51. Gibson, "Countervailing Forces," ch. 5.
52. Data provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (FMP) at the Pentagon, August 1996.
53. Sam Sarkesian, John A. Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, Soldiers, Society and National Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), 18.
54. This analysis is primarily derived from the interviews Gibson conducted. See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Charles J. Hitch, Decision-making for Defense (Berkeley, CA: UCLA Press, 1965).
55. This analysis is primarily derived from the interviews Gibson conducted. See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Charles J. Hitch, Decision-making for Defense (Berkeley, CA: UCLA Press, 1965).
56. Stubbing and Mendel, The Defense Game (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).
57. Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Military Officer," Joint Force Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1996): 53-57.
58. Gibson's interviews with Dr. David Chu and General (ret.) Ed "Shy" Meyer.
59. John F. Lehman, Command of the Seas: Building the 600-Ship Navy (New York: Scribner's 1988).
60. The document Joint Vision 2010 is a long-term vision of warfare and the U.S. role in it. It was developed in 1995-1996 by the Joint Staff under General Shalikashvili, and is reflective of the type of innovative thinking often done in earlier years by civilian defense intellectuals.
61. See also Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" 7-33.