Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 105-113

  Hug, Simon ^a   König, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b Deutsches Forschungsinstitut für öffentliche Verwaltung   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248575990     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9021-2     Document Type: Review

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