Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 153-176

  König, Thomas ^a   Finke, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer   (Germany)

Author keywords

EU constitution; Intergovernmental conference; Ratification; Referendum; Two level game; Veto player

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248549463     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9018-x     Document Type: Article

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