Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 131-152

  Lenz, Hartmut ^b   Dorussen, Han ^a   Ward, Hugh ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Constitutional treaty; Domestic constraints; European union; Public commitment; Signaling games

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248596490     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9017-y     Document Type: Article

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