Explaining the European Parliament's gains in the EU Constitution

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 115-129

  Benedetto, Giacomo ^a   Hix, Simon ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Delegation; Democratic deficit; EU Constitution; European Parliament

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248579464     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9019-9     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Beach, D. (2005). Die dynamics of European integration: Why and when EU institutions matter. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
2. Benedetto, G. & Hoyland, B. (2007). The reform of the EU annual budgetary procedure: Existing rules, the Convention proposal and the Intergovernmental Conference, 2002-2004. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(3), in press.
3. Crombez, C. (1996). Legislative procedures in the European community. British Journal of Political Science, 26(2), 199-218.
4. Crombez, C. (1997). The co-decision procedure in the European Union. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1), 97-119.
5. Hix, S. (2002). Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation: Why the European parliament won at Amsterdam. British Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 259-280.
6. Hix, S. (2005). Neither a preference-outlier nor a unitary actor: Institutional reform preferences of the European parliament. Comparative European Politics, 3(2), 131-154.
7. Kreppel, A. (1999). What affects the European parliament's legislative influence? Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3), 521-538.
8. Kreppel, A. (2002). The European parliament and supranational party system. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
10. Moravcsik, A., & Nicolaïdis, K. (1998). Keynote article: Federal ideals and constitutional realities in the treaty of Amsterdam. Journal of Common Market Studies. Annual Review, 36, 13-38.
11. Moravcsik, A., & Nicolaïdis, K. (1999). Explaining the treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, influence, institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(1), 59-85.
12. Pollack, M. A., (2003). The engines of European integration: Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Rittberger, B. (2005). Building Europe's parliament: Democratic representation beyond the nation state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Tsebelis, G. (1994). The power of the European parliament as a conditional agenda-setter. American Political Science Review, 55(1), 128-142.
15. Tsebelis, G. (1996). Maastricht and the democratic deficit. Aussenwirtschaft, 52(1/2), 29-56.
16. Tsebelis, G., & Yataganas, X. (2002). Veto players and decision-making in the EU after nice: Policy stability and bureaucratic/judicial discretion. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 283-307.