Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 191-222

  Hellwig, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Equilibrium convergence; Global games; Higher order beliefs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036930352     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2947     Document Type: Article

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