Bidding markets

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-47

  Klemperer, Paul ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34047211273     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: 17446422     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhl017     Document Type: Article

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