Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 195-204

  Salant, David ^a  

^a NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034401398     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008196131032     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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