Almost common values auctions revisited

European Economic Review

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 1125-1136

  Levin, Dan ^a   Kagel, John H ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Almost common value auction; English auction; First price auction; Hybrid auction; Second price auction

Indexed keywords

MARKET CONDITIONS; PRICE DYNAMICS;

EID: 13444291364     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.06.001     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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