Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 180, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 617-629

  Mishra, Debasis ^a   Veeramani, Dharmaraj ^b  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

^b University of Wisconsin Madison   (United States)

Author keywords

Iterative auctions; Procurement auctions; Vickrey Dutch auctions; Winner determination problem

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION DISSEMINATION; ITERATIVE METHODS;

ITERATIVE AUCTIONS; PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS; VICKREY-DUTCH AUCTIONS; WINNER DETERMINATION PROBLEM;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 33846811703     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.020     Document Type: Article

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