An ascending price procurement auction for multiple items with unit supply

IIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial Engineers)

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 127-140

  Mishra, Debasis ^a   Veermani, Dharmaraj ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; ECONOMICS; FINANCIAL DATA PROCESSING; INDUSTRY; ITERATIVE METHODS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

BIDDER COST DETERMINATION; COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM PRICE; INFORMATION REVELATION; PRICE PROCUREMENT AUCTION; SUPPLY CHAIN;

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

EID: 30544435555     PISSN: 0740817X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/074081791009040     Document Type: Article

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