Ascending price Vickrey auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 215-241

  Bikhchandani, Sushil ^a   Ostroy, Joseph M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Assignment model; Buyers are substitutes; Linear programming; Multi object auctions; Primal dual algorithm; Walrasian equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645902171     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00141-6     Document Type: Article

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