Communication and incentive mechanisms based on group performance: An experimental study of nonpoint pollution control

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 599-613

  Vossler, Christian A ^a   Poe, Gregory L ^b   Schulze, William D ^b   Segerson, Kathleen ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^b Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749618130     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbj043     Document Type: Review

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