Non-point-source pollution regulation as a multi-task principal-agent problem

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 95-116

  Chambers, Robert G ^a   Quiggin, John ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Multi task principal agent; Non point source solution

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029690983     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01486-8     Document Type: Article

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