Ambient taxes under m-dimensional choice sets, heterogeneous expectations, and risk-aversion

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 189-202

  Horan, Richard D ^a   Shortle, James S ^b   Abler, David G ^b  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ambient taxes; Asymmetric information; Nonpoint pollution; Risk aversion; Water quality

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; POLLUTION; PROBABILITY; TAXATION;

POLLUTERS;

RISK ASSESSMENT;

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; POLLUTION TAX; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0036215212     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014584418846     Document Type: Article

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