Collective versus random fining: An experimental study on controlling ambient pollution

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 231-252

  Alpízar, Francisco ^a   Requate, Till ^b   Schram, Albert ^c  

^a CATIE   (Costa Rica)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

^c GHENT UNIVERSITY   (Belgium)

Author keywords

environmental regulation; experimental economics; non point pollution; subject pool

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE GAMES; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES; RANDOM FINING;

DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; GAME THEORY; RANDOM PROCESSES; SAMPLING; STUDENTS;

POLLUTION CONTROL;

COFFEE; ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION; REGULATORY APPROACH;

EID: 6044261510     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000044608.66145.0c     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Ball, S. B and P.-A. Cech (1996), 'Subject Pool Choice and Treatment Effects in Economic Laboratory Research', Research in Experimental Economics 6, 239-292.
2. Beattie, J. and G. Loomes (1997), 'The Impact of Incentives Upon Risky Choice Experiments', Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 14, 155-168.
3. Binmore, K. (1999), 'Why Experiment in Economics', The Economic Journal 109, F16-F24.
4. Coller, M. and G. Harrison (1997), 'Methods in Experimental Economics: A Review', Journal of International and Comparative Economics 5, 321-334.
5. Cunningham, W., W. T. Anderson and J. H. Murphy (1974), 'Are Students Real People?' Journal of Business 47(3), 399-409.
6. Friedman, D and S. Sunder (1994), Experimental Methods, A Primer for Economists. New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
8. Gibbons J. D. and S. Chakraborti (1992), Nonparametric Statistical Inference, 3rd edition. New York: Marcel Dekker.
9. Herriges, J., R. Govindasamy and J. F. Shogren (1994), 'Budget-Balancing Incentive Mechanisms', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27(3), 275-285.
10. Holmström, Bengt (1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340.
11. Kritikos, A. (1993), 'Environmental Policy under Imperfect Information: Comment', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25(1), 89-92.
12. Meran G. and U. Schwalbe (1987), 'Pollution Control and Collective Penalties', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143, 616-629.
13. Nalbantian, H. R. and A. Schotter (1997), 'Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study', American Economic Review 87(3), 314-341.
14. Plot, C. (1982), 'Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics', Journal of Economic Literature 20(4), 1485-1527.
15. Rasmusen, E. (1987), 'Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams', The Rand Journal of Economics 18(3), 428-435.
16. Segerson, K. (1988), 'Uncertainty and the Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 15(1), 87-98.
17. Siegel, S. and N. J. Castellan (1988), Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill.
18. Smith, V. (1982), 'Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science', American Economic Review 72(5), 923-955.
19. Spraggon, J. (2002), 'Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards', Journal of Public Economics 84, 427-456.
20. Starmer, C. (1999), 'Experimental Economics: Hard Science or Wasteful Tinkering', The Economic Journal 109, F5-F15.
21. Starmer, C. and R. Sugden (1991), 'Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation', American Economic Review 81, 971-978.
22. Xepapadeas, A. (1991), 'Environmental Policy under Imperfect Information: Incentives and Moral Hazard', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20, 113-126.