Weak isomorphism of extensive games

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 267-290

  Casajus, André ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Equivalence; Representation; Sequential rationality; Symmetry; Transformation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141760452     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00064-7     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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