A law and economics perspective on terrorism

Public Choice

Volumn 128, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 147-168

  Garoupa, Nuno ^a   Klick, Jonathan ^b   Parisi, Francesco ^c  

^a UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Basic crime model; Communal liability; Deterrence; Incapacitation; Organized crime; Penalty enhancements; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748553740     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9058-4     Document Type: Article

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