Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 243-252

  Garoupa, Nuno ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042512172     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.987     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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