Optimal law enforcement and victim precaution

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 197-206

  Hylton, Keith N ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030551235     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555799     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. BECCARIA, C. On Crimes and Punishments. New York: Macmillan, 1963.
2. BECKER, G.S. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76 (1968), pp. 169-217.
3. BENTHAM, J. A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948.
4. CLOTFELTER, C.T. "Private Security and the Public Safety." Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 5 (1978), pp. 388-402.
5. _ AND SEELEY, R.D. "The Private Costs of Crime." In C.M. Gray, ed., The Costs of Crime. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.
6. HYLTON, K.N. "The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence." International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 10 (1990), pp. 161-171.
7. POLINSKY, A.M. AND CHE, Y.-K. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22 (1991), pp. 562-570.
8. _ AND SHAVELL, S. "The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines." American Economic Review, Vol. 69 (1979), pp. 880-891.
9. _ AND _. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 35 (1992), pp. 133-148.
10. SHAVELL, S. "Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior." International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 11 (1991), pp. 123-132.
11. SKOGH, G. "A Note on Gary Becker's Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 75 (1973), pp. 305-311.
12. STIGLER, G.J. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78 (1970), pp. 526-536.