Salvation as a selective incentive

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 15-32

  Klick, Jonathan ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Charity; Clubs; Free riding; Religion; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746512657     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2006.05.001     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Buchanan J. An economic theory of clubs. Economica 32 125 (1965) 1-14
2. Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2000.
3. Ekelund R., Hebert R., Tollison R., and Anderson G. Sacred trust: The medieval church as an economic firm (1996), Oxford University Press, New York
4. Ekelund R., Hebert R., and Tollison R. An economic analysis of the Protestant reformation. The Journal of Political Economy 110 3 (2002) 646-671
5. Finke R. Innovative returns to tradition: Using core teachings as the foundation for innovative accomodation. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43 1 (2004) 19-34
6. Hall S. Doctrine and practice in the early church (1991), Eerdmans Publishing, Grand Rapids, MI
7. Hoge D., Zech C., McNamara P., and Donohue M. Money matters: Personal giving in american churches (1996), Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville, KY
8. Iannaccone L. A formal model of Church and sect. American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988) S241-S268
9. Iannaccone L. Sacrifice and stigma: Reducing free-riding in cults, communes, and other collectives. The Journal of Political Economy 100 2 (1992) 271-291
10. Iannaccone L. Why strict churches are strong. American Journal of Sociology 99 5 (1994) 1180-1211
11. Iannaccone L. Skewness explained: A rational choice model of religious giving. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 36 2 (1997) 141-157
12. Knight F. Some fallacies in the interpretation of social cost. Quarterly Journal of Economics 38 4 (1924) 582-606
13. Kuran T. Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification (1995), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
14. Maurer A. Medieval philosophy (1962), Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto
15. McGrath A. Iustitia dei: A history of the Christian doctrine of justification (1998), Cambridge University Press, New York
16. Olson M. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups (1965), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
17. Olson M., and Zeckhauser R. An economic theory of alliances. The Review of Economics and Statistics 48 3 (1966) 266-279
18. Ozment S. The age of reform 1250-1550: An intellectual and religious history of late medieval and reformation Europe (1980), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT
19. Pigou A. The economics of welfare (1920), Macmillan, London
20. Tiebout C. A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political Economy 64 5 (1956) 416-424
21. Zaleski P., and Zech C. Determinants of contributions to religious organizations: Free riding and other factors. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 51 4 (1992) 459-472
22. Zaleski P., and Zech C. The optimal size of a religious congregation: An economic theory of club analysis. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 54 4 (1995) 439-453
23. Zech C. Generational differences in the determinants of religious giving. Review of Religious Research 41 4 (2000) 545-559