Many-to-one stable matching: Geometry and fairness

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 581-596

  Sethuraman, Jay ^a   Teo, Chung Piaw ^b   Qian, Liwen ^c  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Fairness; Linear programming; Matching with couples; Randomized rounding; Stable matching; Two sided market; University admissions

Indexed keywords

FAIRNESS; MATCHING WITH COUPLES; RANDOMIZED ROUNDING; STABLE MATCHING; TWO SIDED MARKET; UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS;

LINEAR PROGRAMMING; LINEAR SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES; THEOREM PROVING;

LINEAR ALGEBRA;

EID: 33748416208     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1060.0207     Document Type: Article

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