On a characterization of stable matchings

Economics Letters

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 43-49

  Adachi, Hiroyuki ^a  

^a KYOTO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

C71; Gale Shapley marriage problem; Lattice; Stable matching; Two sided matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034381905     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00241-4     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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