Of stable marriages and graphs, and strategy and polytopes

SIAM Review

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 575-604

  Balinski, Michel ^a   Ratier, Guillaume ^b  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

Game; Marriage problem; Polytope; Stable matching graph; Two sided market

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL GEOMETRY; GRAPH THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

MARRIAGE GAMES; STABLE MATCHINGS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0031371586     PISSN: 00361445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/S0036144595294515     Document Type: Article

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