An empirical comparison of the performance of classical power indices

Political Studies

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-22

  Leech, Dennis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036522729     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00356     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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