Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 263-280

  Austen Smith, David ^a   Banks, Jeffrey S ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Costly signaling; Refinements

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036107777     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Regulating lobbyists and interest group influence
2. Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
3. Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes
4. Campaign contributions and access
5. Cheap talk and burned money
6. Lobbying for a legislator's vote
7. Interest groups, influence and welfare
8. A model of electoral competition under incomplete information
9. Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters
10. Persuasion through the purse: How political contributions crowd out information
11. The road to war is strewn with peaceful intentions
12. Strategic information transmission
13. An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power
14. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers
15. Money talks: Deterring quality challengers in Congressional elections
16. The swing voter's curse
17. Collective decision making and standing committees: An informational rationale for restictive amendment procedures
18. Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee
19. The revelation of information through the electoral process: An exploratory analysis
20. Asymmetric information and legislative rules: Some amendments
21. A signaling model of informative and manipulative political action
22. Information, access and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying
23. Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics: The role of domestic groups
24. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive compatibility
25. Lobbying and asymmetric information
26. Nuclear brinkmanship with two-sided incomplete information
27. Campaign contributions and the desirability of full disclosure laws