Europe's constitutional monstrosity

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 321-334

  Krisch, Nico ^a  

^a MERTON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744472031     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqi016     Document Type: Note

References (70)

1. Severinus de Monzambano (Samuel Pufendorf), De statu imperii Germanici (1667) ch VI, 9§.
2. P. Allott, 'Epilogue: Europe and the dream of reason' in European Constitutionalism, 202-25.
3. H. von Cocceji, Juris publici prudentia compendio exhibita, 1695
4. quoted in M. Stolleis, 'Die Historische Schule und das öffentliche Recht' in id., Konstitution and Intervention: Studien zur Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts im 19. Jahrhundert (2001) 33-46 at 35; translation by the author.
5. J.H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind, 'Introduction: European constitutionalism beyond the state' in European Constitutionalism, 1-4 at 2-3.
6. See also U. Haltern, 'Gestalt und Finalität' in Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Armin von Bogdandy (ed.) (2003) 803-45 at 830.
7. M. Wind, 'The European Union as a polycentric polity: Returning to a neo-medieval Europe' in European Constitutionalism, 103-31 at 127.
8. M. Poiares Maduro, 'Europe and the constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?' in European Constitutionalism, 74-102 at 95-96
9. and see N. MacCormick, 'Beyond the Sovereign State' (1993) 56 MLR, 1-18.
10. N. Walker, 'Postnational constitutionalism and the problem of translation' in European Constitutionalism, 27-54 at 54
11. see also his 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism' (2002) 65 MLR, 317-59.
12. Allott, above n 2 at 215-25.
13. J.H.H. Weiler, 'In defence of the status quo: Europe's constitutional Sonderweg' in European Constitutionalism, 7-23 at 18-23.
14. See A. Reed Amar 'Of Sovereignty and Federalism', Yale Law Journal 96, 1425-1520 at 1429-66, 1502-03
15. S. Oeter 'Souveränität and Demokratie als Problem in der 'Verfassungsentwicklung' der Europäischen Union', (1995) 55 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 659-707.
16. Weiler, above n 10 at 8-9
17. but see his more subtle approach in 'To be a European citizen: Eros and civilization' in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999) 324-57.
18. See only J. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (1998);
19. S. Oeter, 'Föderalismus' in Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, above n 5, 59-119 at 107-09.
20. R. Dehousse, 'Beyond representative democracy: Constitutionalism in a polycentric polity' in European Constitutionalism, 135-56 at 137-38
21. Maduro, above n 7 at 81-86.
22. Dehousse, ibid.
23. See only A. von Bogdandy, Gubernative Rechtsetzung (2000).
24. For related approaches on the global level, see B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B. Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law' in Law & Contemporary Problems 68 (2005), forthcoming.
25. See only R.B. Stewart, 'The Reformation of Administrative Law', Harvard Law Review 88, 1669-1813 at 1760-1790, 1802-1805 (1975);
26. and Stewart 'Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century', New York University Law Review 78, 437-60 at 445 (2003).
27. See only M. Shapiro, '"Deliberative", "Independent" Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?', (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary Problems forthcoming.
28. See also A. Moravcsik 'In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603-24.
29. Walker, 'Postnational constitutionalism', above n 8.
30. Ibid at 42.
31. Ibid at 53.
32. Ibid at 37, n 22.
33. See only A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, 1993).
34. A. Wiener, 'Finality vs. enlargement: Constitutive practices and opposing rationales in the reconstruction of Europe' in European Constitutionalism, 157-201 at 170-71.
35. See J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (1995).
36. Just see L. Pospíšil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (1971), ch. 4
37. Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law, H. Petersen and H. Zahle (eds) (1995).
38. G. Teubner, 'The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy' (1997) Law & Society Review 31, 763-88 at 763.
39. Maduro, above n 7, 75.
40. Ibid at 75, n 2.
41. Ibid at 100.
42. With this, Maduro closely follows Neil MacCormick, who likewise softens his pluralist approach by introducing an overarching (in his case: international legal) framework; see his 'Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?' (1998) 18 OJLS, 517-32.
43. Weiler, above n 10.
44. Allott, above n 2 at 215, 221.
45. Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism', above n 8, 333.
46. For a useful recent overview, see only P. Craig, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union' (2001) 7 European Law Journal, 125-50.
47. See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). One may add that both authors tend to neglect this element once they turn to concrete applications.
48. See C. Möllers, 'Verfassunggebende Gewalt - Verfassung - Konstitutionalisierung: Begriffe der Verfassung in Europa' in Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, above n 5, 1-57 at 3-18
49. see also Tully, above n 27, chs 2 to 5.
50. See also D. Grimm, 'Ursprung and Wandel der Verfassung' in Handbuch des Staatsrechts, J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), vol. 1 (3rd edn, 2003).
51. As mentioned before, though, Maduro's position is slightly ambiguous. Walker, too, introduces an element of ambiguity by pointing in a footnote to the importance of the constitution as an 'authoritative frame'; however, he does not take this idea up again. See Walker, 'Postnational constitutionalism', above n 8 at 32-33, n 14.
52. Allott, above n 2 at 215, 223-24.
53. See only Tully, above n 27
54. R. Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a politics of compromise (1999).
55. Weiler, above n 10 at 18-21. Weiler does not distinguish between 'peoples', 'nations' and 'states', which somewhat undermines the basis of his argument in cultural diversity. For an approach based on respect also for cultural minority groups,
56. see N. Torbisco Casals, Building the European Polity: Towards a Multicultural Model of Integration?, Grup de Recerca en Teoria Política, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Working Paper no. 1, 2003, 27-28.
57. Maduro, above n 7 at 98, and passim.
58. Wind, above n 6 at 103. Unfortunately, Wind never really comes back to this challenge.
59. Maduro, above n 7 at 99.
60. See above, section 3.
61. Wiener, above n 26 at 170-71.
62. F. Snyder, 'The unfinished constitution of the European Union: principles, processes and culture' in European Constitutionalism, 55-73, especially 62-72.
63. See only D. Miller, On Nationality (1995).
64. See Torbisco Casals, above n 44 at 31-34.
65. For an analysis of recent constitutions along these lines, see R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004).
66. On the institutionalization of 'public reason' in constitutional courts, see J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1992), 231-40.
67. See Tully, above n 27
68. Bellamy, above n 43.
69. See only K. Ladeur, 'Postmoderne Verfassungstheorie' in Zum Begriff der Verfassung, Ulrich K. Preuß (ed.) (1994) at 304-26.
70. For the latter, see, for example, the recent proposal in J. Habermas, 'Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?' in id., Der gespaltene Westen (2004), 113-93 at 172-78, which is in many respects surprisingly similar to the order envisaged in C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde M⊣chte (1939).