Making the IMF and the World Bank more accountable

International Affairs

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 83-100

  Woods, Ngaire ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039892168     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00179     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. The terms 'World Bank' and 'the Bank' are widely used in this article and also to refer to the World Bank Group of institutions which comprises the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
2. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
3. Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula Review Group (Washington DC: IMF, 2000). For earlier critiques see Nancy Wagner, A review of PPP-adjusted GDP estimation and its potential use for the Fund's operational purposes, IMF Working Paper (Washington DC: IMF, 1995); Ariel Buira, 'The governance of the International Monetary Fund', in Roy Culpeper and Caroline Pestieau, eds, Development and global governance (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, North-South Institute, 1996).
4. Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula Review Group (Washington DC: IMF, 2000). For earlier critiques see Nancy Wagner, A review of PPP-adjusted GDP estimation and its potential use for the Fund's operational purposes, IMF Working Paper (Washington DC: IMF, 1995); Ariel Buira, 'The governance of the International Monetary Fund', in Roy Culpeper and Caroline Pestieau, eds, Development and global governance (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, North-South Institute, 1996).
5. Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula Review Group (Washington DC: IMF, 2000). For earlier critiques see Nancy Wagner, A review of PPP-adjusted GDP estimation and its potential use for the Fund's operational purposes, IMF Working Paper (Washington DC: IMF, 1995); Ariel Buira, 'The governance of the International Monetary Fund', in Roy Culpeper and Caroline Pestieau, eds, Development and global governance (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, North-South Institute, 1996).
6. IMF, The IMF's response to the Asian crisis (Washington DC: IMF, 1998).
7. Joseph Gold, Voting and decisions in the International Monetary Fund (Washington DC: IMF, 1972), pp. 18, 173-4.
8. Keith J. Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: twenty years of international monetary cooperation, vol. 1 (Washington DC: IMF, 1996).
9. Ngaire Woods, 'The challenge of good governance for the IMF and the World Bank themselves', World Development 28: 5, May 2000.
10. IMF, 'External evaluation of IMF surveillance', report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1999), p. 34; World Bank, 'Report of the ad hoc committee on Board procedures', 26 May (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992).
11. IMF, 'External evaluation of IMF surveillance', report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1999), p. 34; World Bank, 'Report of the ad hoc committee on Board procedures', 26 May (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992).
12. IMF, 'External evaluation'; World Bank, 'Report of the ad hoc committee'.
13. IMF, 'External evaluation'; World Bank, 'Report of the ad hoc committee'.
14. IMF, 'External evaluation', p. 34.
15. Devesh Kapur, 'Expansive agendas and weak instruments: governance related conditionalities of the international financial institutions', Journal of Policy Reform (forthcoming); Devesh Kapur and Richard Webb, Governance-related conditionalities of the international financial institutions (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000).
16. Devesh Kapur, 'Expansive agendas and weak instruments: governance related conditionalities of the international financial institutions', Journal of Policy Reform (forthcoming); Devesh Kapur and Richard Webb, Governance-related conditionalities of the international financial institutions (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000).
17. World Bank Articles of Agreement, Article III, 6.2.; IMF Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 1.
18. Of course, the external line of accountability does not always produce the outcomes desired by the IFIs, as argued by Paul Collier, 'Learning from failure: the international financial institutions as agencies of restraint in Africa', in Schedler et al., The self-restraining state, pp. 313-32.
19. IMF, 'External evaluation', p. 35.
20. Martin Feldstein, 'Refocusing the IMF', Foreign Affairs 77: 2, March/April 1998, pp. 20-33.
21. For an updated list of countries preparing PRSPs see www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/.
22. World Bank, Partnership for development: from vision to action (Washington DC: World Bank, 1998).
23. IMF, 'The IMF in a changing world', remarks by Horst Köhler, Managing Director, given at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 7 Aug. 2000.
24. See comments by Richard Sklar on Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Horizontal accountability in new democracies', in Schedler et al., Tlie self-restraining state, pp. 29-51.
25. See IMF, Report to the IMFC on the Establishment of the Independent Evaluation Office and its Terms of Reference (Washington DC, 12 September 2000).
26. World Bank, China: Western Poverty Reduction Project Inspection Panel report (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000); and see www.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/.
27. World Bank, China: Western Poverty Reduction Project Inspection Panel report (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000); and see www.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/.
28. Robert Wade, 'A defeat for development and multilateralism: the World Bank has been unfairly criticised over the Qinghai Resettlement Project' (full manuscript unpublished, short version published in Financial Times, 4 July 2000).
29. See comments by Philippe Schmitter on Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Horizontal accountability in new democracies' in Schedler et al., The self-restraining state, pp. 29-51.
30. Wade, 'A defeat for development'.
31. Lawrence Summers, 'The right kind of IMF for a stable global financial system', remarks to the London Business School, 14 Dec. 1999 (US Treasury: LS-294).
32. World Bank, Animal Review of Development Effectiveness (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999).
33. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
34. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
35. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
36. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
37. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
38. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
39. See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989), Governance and development (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992), Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994); The World Bank participation source book (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), and Annual Review; IMF, Good governance: the IMF's role (Washington DC: IMF, 1997); 'External evaluation of the ESAF,' report by a group of independent experts (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); A guide to progress in strengthening the architecture of the international financial system (Washington DC: IMF, 2000).
40. Jan Aart Scholte, 'The IMF meets civil society', Finance and Development 25: 3, Sept. 1998, pp. 42-5.
41. Charles Abugre and Nancy Alexander, 'Non-governmental organizations and the international, monetary and financial system', International monetary and financial issues for the 1990s, vol. 9 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1998). pp. 107-25.
42. Ibid., p. 114.
43. For the original statement of the Washington consensus see John Williamson, Latin American adjustment: how much has happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1990). For subsequent analysis see Moises Naim, 'Washington consensus or Washington confusion?, Foreign Policy no. 118, 2000, pp. 86ff; Joseph Stiglitz, More instruments and broader goals: moving towards the post-Washington consensus (Helsinki: WIDER/United Nations University, 1998); and Robin Broad and J. Cavanagh, 'The death of the Washington consensus?', World Policy Journal 16: 3, 1999, pp. 79-88.
44. For the original statement of the Washington consensus see John Williamson, Latin American adjustment: how much has happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1990). For subsequent analysis see Moises Naim, 'Washington consensus or Washington confusion?, Foreign Policy no. 118, 2000, pp. 86ff; Joseph Stiglitz, More instruments and broader goals: moving towards the post-Washington consensus (Helsinki: WIDER/United Nations University, 1998); and Robin Broad and J. Cavanagh, 'The death of the Washington consensus?', World Policy Journal 16: 3, 1999, pp. 79-88.
45. For the original statement of the Washington consensus see John Williamson, Latin American adjustment: how much has happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1990). For subsequent analysis see Moises Naim, 'Washington consensus or Washington confusion?, Foreign Policy no. 118, 2000, pp. 86ff; Joseph Stiglitz, More instruments and broader goals: moving towards the post-Washington consensus (Helsinki: WIDER/United Nations University, 1998); and Robin Broad and J. Cavanagh, 'The death of the Washington consensus?', World Policy Journal 16: 3, 1999, pp. 79-88.
46. For the original statement of the Washington consensus see John Williamson, Latin American adjustment: how much has happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1990). For subsequent analysis see Moises Naim, 'Washington consensus or Washington confusion?, Foreign Policy no. 118, 2000, pp. 86ff; Joseph Stiglitz, More instruments and broader goals: moving towards the post-Washington consensus (Helsinki: WIDER/United Nations University, 1998); and Robin Broad and J. Cavanagh, 'The death of the Washington consensus?', World Policy Journal 16: 3, 1999, pp. 79-88.
47. Abugre and Alexander, 'Non-governmental organizations'.
48. James Bohman, 'International regimes and democratic governance: political equality and influence in global institutions', International Affairs 75: 3, 1999, pp. 499-513, at p. 511.
49. Abugre and Alexander, 'Non-governmental organizations', p. 116.
50. I am grateful to Devesh Kapur for spurring me to think about this issue.
51. Robert A. Dahl, 'Can international organizations be democratic?' in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds. Democracy's edges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19-36, at p. 33.