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Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 49-79

Bicameral winning coalitions and equilibrium federal legislatures

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EID: 4143052559     PISSN: 03629805     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3162/036298004X201096     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (15)

References (33)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.