Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why does Malapportionment Matter?

American Political Science Review

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 471-481

  Ansolabehere, Stephen ^a   Snyder Jr , James M ^a   Ting, Michael M ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141596287     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055403000819     Document Type: Article

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