A model of endogenous political party platforms

Economic Theory

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 373-394

  Gomberg, Andrei M ^a   Marhuenda, Francisco ^b   Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio ^c  

^a INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Endogenous party formation; Multidimensional policy space

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142723138     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0428-6     Document Type: Article

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