Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 445-454

  Gerber, Anke ^a   Ortuno Ortin, Ignacio ^b  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032379028     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050116     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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3. Fedderson T (1992) A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout. American Journal of Political Science 36: 938-962
4. Greenberg J, Weber S (1993) Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives. Journal of Economic Theory 60: 62-82
5. Greenberg J, Weber S (1995) Multiparty Equilibrium under Proportional Representation. American Political Science Review 76: 693-703
6. Halmos P.R. (1951) Measure Theory. D. van Nostrand, New York
7. Ortuno-Ortin I (1997) A Spatial Model of Political Competition and Proportional Representation. Social Choice and Welfare, 14: 427-438