Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 545-562

  Merrill III, Samuel ^a   Grofman, Bernard ^b  

^a WILKES UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031476055     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050086     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Cohen L, Matthews SA (1980) Constrained Plott equilibria, directional equilibria and global cycling sets. Rev Econ Studies 47: 975-986
2. Davis O, DeGroot M, Hinich MJ (1972) Social preference orderings and majority rule. Econometrica 40: 147-157
3. Matthews SA (1979) A simple direction model of electoral competition. Public Choice 34: 141-156
4. McKelvey RD, Ordeshook P, Ungar P (1980) Conditions for voting equilibria in continuous voter distributions. S.I.A.M. J Appl Math 39: 161-168
5. Merrill S, Grofman, B (1996) Nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two-candidate spatial competition. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, April 12-14, Houston, TX
6. Plott CR (1967) A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. Am Econ Rev 57: 787-806
7. Rabinowitz G, Macdonald SE (1989) A directional theory of issue voting. Am Polit Science Rev 83: 93-121
8. Zygmund A (1959) Trigonometric series (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge