Changes in the location of the median voter in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1996

Public Choice

Volumn 106, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 221-232

  Grofman, Bernard ^a   Koetzle, William ^d   Merrill, Samuel ^b   Brunell, Thomas ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WILKES UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035580474     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005250500200     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Aldrich, J.H. and Rohde, D.W. (1995). Theories of party in the legislature and the transition to Republican rule in the House. Working Paper 95-05, Program in political institutions and public choice, Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, Michigan State University.
2. Black, D. (1958). The theory of committees and elections. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
4. Enelow, J. and Hinich, M.J. (1984). The spatial theory of voting. New York/London: Cambridge University Press.
5. Enelow, J. and Hinich, M.J. (Eds.) (1990). Advances in the spatial theory of voting. New York/London: Cambridge University Press.
6. Grofman, B., Griffin, R. and Glazer, A. (1990). Identical geography, different party: A natural experiment on the magnitude of party differences in the U.S. Senate, 1960-84. In R.J. Johnston, F.M. Shelley and P.J. Taylor (Eds.), Developments in electoral geography, 207-217. London: Routledge.
7. Grofman, B. and Handley, L. (1998). Estimating the impact of voting-rights-act-related districting on democratic strength in the U.S. House of Representatives. In B. Grofman (Ed.), Race and redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Agathon Press.
8. Grofman, B., Merrill, S., Brunell, T. and Koetzle, W. (1999). The potential electoral disadvantages of a catch-all party: Ideological variance among Republicans and Democrats in the 50 states. Party Politics 5: 199-210.
9. Groseclose, T., Levitt, S.D. and Snyder, J.M. Jr. (1999). Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the U.S. Congress. American Political Science Review 93: 33-50.
10. Hinich, M.J. and Munger, M.C. (1994). Ideology and the theory of political choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
11. Lublin, D.I. (1995). Race, representation and redistricting. In P.E. Peterson (Ed.), Classifying by race. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
12. Merrill, S., Grofman, B., Brunell, T. and Koetzle, W. (1999). The power of ideologically concentrated minorities. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 57-74.
13. Miller, N. (1996). Majority rule and minority interests. In I. Shapiro and R. Hardin (Eds.), Political order. New York: New York University Press.
14. Ornstein, N., Mann, T. and Malbin, M. (1991). Vital statistics on Congress, 1989-1990. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
15. Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. New York/London: Oxford University Press.