Policy-motivated candidates, noisy platforms, and non-robustness

Public Choice

Volumn 114, Issue 3-4, 2003, Pages 319-347

  Lagerlöf, Johan ^a  

^a WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037285251     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022637701978     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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